State v. Key Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 35955 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-8-2009
State v. Key Appellant's Brief Dckt. 35955
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Key Appellant's Brief Dckt. 35955" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 286.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/286
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) 




GINGER J. KEY, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF IDAHO 
.-. - - 
HONORABLE JEFF M. BRUDl 
District Judge 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender Deputy Attorney General 
State of Idaho Criminal Law Division 
I.S.B. # 4843 P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010 
SARA B. THOMAS (208) 334-4534 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. # 5867 
SARAH E. TOMPKlNS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. # 7901 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................. 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... I 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................. 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ..................................................................... 8 
......................................................................................................... ARGUMENT 9 
I. Ms. Key's Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial, Pursuant To 
Article 1, § 7 Of The ldaho State Constitution, Was Violated 
When The lssue Of Whether The State Was Entitled To 
Forfeiture Of Ms. Key's Vehicle Was Tried Before The 
District Court Judge, Despite The Fact That Ms. Key Never 
L Waived Her Right To A Jury Determination Of This Issue ......................... 9 
i ' . , 
A. Introduction .................................  .................................................. 9 
B. Standard Of Review ............. ...... ............................................. 9 
C. Ms. Key's Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial, Pursuant To 
Article 1, 3 7 Of The ldaho State Constitution, Was Violated 
When The lssue Of Whether The State Was Entitled To 
Forfeiture Of Ms. Key's Vehicle Was Tried Before The 
District Court Judge, Despite The Fact That Ms. Key Never 
Waived Her Right To A Jury Determination Of This Issue .................... 9 
11. Ms. Key's Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial, Pursuant To The 
Sixth Amendment Of The United States Constitution, Was Violated 
When The lssue Of Whether The State Was Entitled To Forfeiture 
Of Ms. Key's Vehicle Was Tried Before The District Court, Despite 
The Fact That Ms. Key Never Waived Her Right To A Jury 
Determination Of This Issue .................................................................... 14 
A. Introduction ..................................................................................... 14 
B. Standard Of Review ............................................................................ 14 
C. Ms. Key's Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial, Pursuant To 
The Sixth Amendment Of The United States Constitution, 
Was Violated When The lssue Of Whether The State Was 
Entitled To Forfeiture Of Ms. Key's Vehicle Was Tried Before 
The District Court, Despite The Fact That Ms. Key Never 
Waived Her Right To A Jury Determination Of This Issue ................. 
Ill. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Make A 
Determination, Pursuant To I.C. § 37-2809, Whether 
The Size Of The Property Forfeited Was Unfairly 
Disproportionate To The Size Of The Property 
Actually Used In The Commission Of Ms. Key's 
Underlying Offense ............................................................................... 18 
A. Introduction ...................................................................................... 18 
B. Standard Of Review ............................................................................ 19 
C. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Make A 
Determination, Pursuant To I.C. Cj 37-2809, Whether 
The Size Of The Property Forfeited Was Unfairly 
Disproportionate To The Size Of The Property Actually 
Used In The Commission Of Ms. Key's Underlying 
Offense ...................................................................................... 19 
IV. The District Court's Order Forfeiting Ms. Key's Vehicle Violated 
The Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Excessive Fines .................. 21 
A. Introduction ..................................................................................... 21 
B. Standard Of Review ............................................................................ 21 
C. District Court's Order Granting The State's Motion Seeking 
Forfeiture Of Ms. Key's Vehicle Violated The Eighth 
Amendment Prohibition Against Excessive Fines ............................... 21 
V. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Determined That 
Ms. Key's Vehicle Was Used To Commit Or Facilitate Her Offense 
Of Possession Of Marijuana ..................................................................... 24 
A. Introduction ..................................................................................... 24 
B. Standard Of Review ............................................................................ 24 
C . The District Court Erred When It Determined That Ms . Key's 
Vehicle Was Used To Commit Or Facilitate Her Offense Of 
Possession Of Marijuana .................................................................... 25 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 27 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 28 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
.................................................... Apprendi v . New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466 (2000) 16 
Austin v . U.S.. 509 U.S. 602 (1993) .................................................................... 19 
...................................................... Blakely v . Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) 16 
....... David Steed & Assoc., Inc . v . Young. 11 5 Idaho 247, 766 P.2d 717 (I 988) 11 
ldaho Dept . of Law Enforcement v . Free, 126 ldaho 422, 885 P.2d 381 (1994) . 11 
ldaho First Naf? Bank v . Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 ldaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 
(1991) .............................................................................................................. 11 
Libretti v . U.S., 516 U.S. 29 (1995) ..................................................................... 17 
Miller v . One 2001 Ponitac Aztec. 669 N.W. 2d 893 n.2 (Minn . 2003) ............. 20 
Minfun v . State. 144 Idaho 656. 168 P.3d 40 (Ct . App . 2007) ............................ 15 
............................................................ Mullaney v . Wilbur. 421 U.S. 684 (1 975) 16 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting ATTy . v . Reese. 142 ldaho 893, 136 P.3d 364 
(Ct . App . 2001) ................................................................................................ 21 
. Riley v . 1987 Station Wagon, 650 N.W.2d 441 (Minn 2002) .............................. 26 
State v . Bingham. 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989) ..................................... 15 
State v . Christiansen. 144 Idaho 463, 163 P.3d 1175 (2007) ....................... 10. 15 
State v . Confreras-Gonzales. 146 Idaho 41. 190 P.3d 197 (Ct . App . 2008) ....... 10 
State v . Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 205 P.3d 671 (Ct . App . 2009) .......................... 16 
State v . Grazian, 144 Idaho 510. 164 P.3d 790 (2007) ...................................... 14 
...................................... State v . Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 826 P.2d 1306 (I 992) 15 
State v . Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 872 P.2d 71 9 (1994) ....................................... 13 
State v . One 1969 Blue Pontiac Firebird. 737 N.W.2d 271 (S.D. 2007) ........ 12. 13 
. . ........................ State v . Stevens. 139 Idaho 670. 84 P.3d 1038 (Ct App 2004) 19 
State v . Stover. 140 Idaho 927. 104 P.3d 969 (2005) ........................................... 9 
. . ....................... State v . Timmons. 145 Idaho 279. 178 P.3d 644 (Ct App 2007) 15 
State v . Twelve Thousand Dollars. 155 P.3d 858 (Ok . Ct . App . 2007) .. 12. 13. 19. 
22. 25 
Sfate v . Yakovic. 145 Idaho 437. 180 P.3d 476 (2008) ....................................... 15 
. Sullivan v Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275 (1 993) ......................................................... 16 
U.S . v . Bajakajian. 524 U.S. 321 (1998) ............................................................ 1 2  
. . .................................................... Van Hoff v U.S.. 492 F.3d 175 (2" Cir 2007) 21 
Statutes 
I.C. § 37-2744A(d) .............................................................................................. 12 
......................................... I.C. § 37-2801 ............................ .. 11, 13, 18, 22, 25 
I.C. § 37-2807 ..................................................................................................... 22 
I.C. § 37-2809 ............................................................................................... 18, 19 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. CONST .AMEND . Vlll ...................................................................................... 21 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State in this case successfully sought criminal forfeiture of Ginger Key's car 
after her plea of guilty to a charge of possession of marijuana in a quantity greater than 
three ounces. Ms. Key timely appeals the district court's Order of Civil Forfeiture in this 
case, and asserts that the provisions of I.C. 3 37-2801 and the procedures employed in 
her case violated her constitutional rights to a jury trial; that there was insufficient 
evidence that the car that Ms. Key was driving when she was arrested was used to 
commit or facilitate her offense of possession of marijuana; and that the forfeiture of her 
vehicle was unfairly disproportionate to her offense, and therefore worked a violation of 
both the Eighth Amendment and I.C. § 37-2809. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Key was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and 
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver where a child is present. (R., pp.16-17.) 
The State subsequently amended these charges to include an additional charge of 
possession of marijuana in an amount greater than three ounces. (R., pp.24-25.) All of 
these charges arose from an allegation of a single act of possession of marijuana that 
was alleged to have occurred "on or about July 13, 2007." (R., pp.5-7, 24.) 
The State the filed notice of its intent to seek criminal forfeiture, pursuant to 
I.C. 3 37-2801, etseq., of some of Ms. Key's property. (R., pp.26-27.) Specifically, the 
State was seeking forfeiture of $2,100 that was found in Ms. Key's purse when she was 
arrested and the car that she was driving at the time of her arrest. (R., pp.5-7,28-29.) 
Prior to the time set for trial, the district court held a hearing to address the 
motions to suppress and motions in limine filed by Ms. K ~ Y . '  (Vol. 1 ~r. ' ,  p.; R., pp.39- 
49.) At this hearing, the State presented testimony from two officers that participated in 
the traffic stop and arrest that led to Ms. Key's criminal charges.3 (Vol. 1 Tr., p.10, L.3 - 
According to the State's evidence, Officer Michael Chleboski was on patrol with 
his drug dog, Gordo, in Elk City on the day that Ms. Key was arrested. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.10, 
Ls.3-7; p.1 I ,  L.3 - p.12, L.5.) At approximately 4:30 in the afternoon, Officer Chleboski 
was driving along Highway 14 when he saw a white Toyota Celica parked near the 
entrance of an abandoned lumber mill. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.12, L.4 - p.14, L.8.) When he saw 
the car parked near the side of the highway, Officer Chleboski turned his car around to 
investigate the situation. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.14, Ls.9-14.) 
As the officer approached the car, he saw two people in the front seat. (Vol. 1 
Tr., p.14, L.22 - p.15, L.3.) The driver and passenger appeared to notice Officer 
' Because Ms. Key is only appealing from the district court's order of forfeiture in this 
case, the specific bases of her pre-trial motions are not specifically discussed herein. 
However, because the prosecutor in this case indicated that he was specifically relying 
on the testimony introduced at this hearing in support of the State's forfeiture request, 
the substance of these proceedings is presented in detail for this Court. ' There are two volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case. For ease of 
reference, citations to the transcripts are made herein with regard to the volume of the 
transcripts. Volume 1 of the transcripts of proceedings refers to the volume of 
transcripts containing the motion in limine hearing held on November 9, 2007; the entry 
of plea hearing held on November 30, 2007; the sentencing hearing held on March 28, 
2008; and the rider review hearing held on October 3, 2008. Volume 2 of the transcripts 
of proceedings refers to the volume of transcripts containing the scheduling hearing 
held on August 28,2007. 
The State also presented several exhibits during this hearing. The first two exhibits 
were the certifications of Officer Chleboski and his drug dog. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.25, Ls.6-20.) 
The remaining exhibits are contained in the record, as they were attached Ms. Key's 
Second Motion in Limine. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.48, L.13 - p.50, L.23; R., pp.46-49.) 
Chleboski right before their car pulled onto the highway without signaling. (Vol. 1 
Tr., p.14, L.22 - p.15, L.17.) According to the officer, the car pulled off again at another 
entrance to the abandoned mill and Officer Chleboski pulled in behind the car. (Vol. 1 
Tr., p.15, Ls.18-25.) 
Officer Chleboski identified the driver as Ms. Key. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.16, L.2 - p.17, 
L.2.) Also in the car were Ms. Key's 15 year old son and two of her dogs. (Vol. 1 
Tr., p.17, L.17 - p.18, L.16.) Once he came up to the car, the officer saw that neither 
Ms. Key, nor her, son were wearing their seatbelts. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.17, Ls.17-20.) Officer 
Chleboski decided to give Ms. Key a written warning for not wearing her seatbelt and for 
entering the highway without signaling. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.17, L.25 - p.18, L.25.) The officer 
went through the written citation with Ms. Key while they were both standing at the 
officer's car. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.19, Ls.3 - 8.) He then told Ms. Key that she was free to 
leave and she walked back to her car. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.19, Ls.1-2, 12-14.) 
But the officer changed his mind, and he returned to Ms. Key's car a second 
time. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.20, Ls.15-20.) Officer Chleboski asked Ms. Key if he could ask her a 
question before she left. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.20, Ls.19-20.) He then asked if she would mind if 
he searched her car using his drug dog. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.21, Ls. 9-10.) Officer Chleboski 
represented that he would normally search the car for drugs using the drug dog during 
any routine traffic stop. (Vol. I Tr., p.21, Ls.12-17.) He also testified that he did not use 
the drug dog earlier in his interaction with Ms. Key because of safety concerns given 
that Ms. Key had two dogs of her own in her car. (Vol. I Tr., p.21, Ls.19-21.) 
Ms. Key expressed hesitation at letting the officer search her car, and told the 
officer that she didn't understand why he was asking to search it. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.21, L.24 
- p.22, L.3.) She also mentioned that she had just gotten off of probation. (Vol. 1 
Tr., p.22, Ls.5-6.) Officer Chleboski then asked Ms. Key to take her dogs out of the car 
so he could have his dog search her car for any odor of drugs. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.22, Ls.7- 
10.) Ms. Key once again told the officer that she didn't understand why Officer 
Chleboski was asking to search her car for drugs, to which the officer replied that it was 
for drug enforcement purposes and that he wanted to use his dog because he had "put 
time and effort in training the dog," so he wanted to use it. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.22, Ls.11-18.) 
A third time, Ms. Key repeated that she didn't understand why the officer kept 
asking to search her car. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.23, Ls.1-2.) He then asked her to get into her 
car, turn on the air conditioner, and then the'officer would perform the search. (Vol. 1 
Tr., p.23, Ls.10-15.) Ms. Key relented and got in her car while Officer Chleboski 
returned with his drug dog. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.23, Ls.16-22 ) 
The officer took the dog around the car. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.30, Ls.12-19.) The dog 
alerted at the front of the car. (Vol. I Tr., p.30, Ls.12-24.) Officer Chleboski then 
ordered Ms. Key, her son, and her two dogs out of the car so he could search the 
interior. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.30, L.25 - p.31, L.5.) Prior to getting out of the car, Ms. Key tried 
to stuff some towels into a black backpack that was inside of her car. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.31, 
L.23 - p.32, L.4.) The officer ordered her to leave the backpack alone and step away 
from the vehicle. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.32, Ls.4-6.) 
During the search of the car using the drug dog, the dog alerted on the contents 
of the backpack. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.32, L.20 - p.33, L.18.) Underneath the towels inside of 
the backpack was a large plastic bag containing a leafy green substance that appeared 
to be consistent with marijuana. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.33, L.24 - p.34, L.3; p.35, Ls.9-11.) 
Officer Chleboski immediately placed Ms. Key under arrest and called Detective Mike 
Quintal for assistance. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.35, L.18 - p.36, L.8.) 
Detective Quintal arrived between thirty and forty minutes later. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.36, 
Ls.9-12.) When the detective arrived, he consulted with Officer Chleboski and looked 
over the baggie containing what the officer believed to be marijuana. (Vol. I Tr., p.45, 
Ls.16-20.) Ms. Key was still handcuffed and in the officer's car. (Vol. I Tr., p.45, Ls.21- 
25; p.46, Ls.1-2.) The detective then read Ms. Key her ~ i r a n d a ~  rights. (Vol. 1 
Tr., p.46, L.23 - p.47, L.2.) When questioned about the backpack containing what the 
officers believed to be marijuana, Ms. Key admitted that the backpack was hers but 
denied any knowledge of any drugs contained inside it. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.47, Ls.19-23.) 
She also claimed ownership of another bag that contained what the officers suspected 
was drug paraphernalia. (Vol. I Tr., p.47, L.24 - p.48, L.3.) The officers also found a 
pieces of paper with what appeared names and numbers and a piece of paper with the 
web address of what the officers discovered was a web site offering advice on how to 
pass drug tests. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.48, L.13 - p.50, L.23; p.54, Ls.2-5; R., pp.46-49.) 
Detective Quintal testified that he believed some of these documents to be consistent 
with drug ledgers for marijuana drug sales. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.51, L.22 - p.52, L.5.) He 
further testified that his estimate for the street value of an ounce of marijuana was 
between $200 and $220 for an ounce. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.59, Ls.6-9.) According to the 
State's Amended Information, Ms. Key was in possession of over five ounces of 
marijuana at the time of her arrest. (R., p.25.) 
Miranda V. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (2966). 
The district court denied Ms. Key's motions in limine and motions to suppress. 
(R., pp.66-74.) Pursuant to an I.C.R. I 1  binding piea agreement, Ms. Key agreed to 
plead guilty to the charge of possession of marijuana in a quantity greater than three 
ounces, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.68, L.16 
- p.72, L.3; R., pp.78-84.) The State agreed to drop its request for forfeiture of the 
money that was found on Ms. Key's person when she was arrested, but would request 
forfeiture of Ms. Key's car. (R., pp.79-81.) As part of this agreement, Ms. Key 
specifically reserved the right to challenge the State's request for forfeiture of her 
vehicle. (R., p.81.) There was nothing requiring the State to recommend an underlying 
sentence, although the State agreed to recommend that the district court retain 
jurisdiction over Ms. Key's case. (R., pp.78-84.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the parties stipulated that the value of Ms. Key's car 
was $1,500, but further noted for the record that Ms. Key had resewed the right, 
pursuant to her plea agreement, to challenge the State's attempt to seek forfeiture of 
the car. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.85, L.24 - p.86, L.6.) The State also informed the district court 
that it was relying on the testimony provided at the hearing on Ms. Key's suppression 
motions, and the material contained in the presentence investigation report, in support 
of its forfeiture claim; but that the State would not provide any additional evidence in 
support. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.86, Ls.7-14.) 
At this same sentencing hearing, the State also presented its argument in favor 
of forfeiture, although defense counsel appears to have been surprised that the matter 
of the forfeiture would be heard at that time. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.91, Ls.8-21, p.92, Ls.21-24.) 
The crux of the State's argument was that, because the backpack containing marijuana 
was found within Ms. Key's car, the car was being used to transport, and thereby 
facilitate, the possession. (Vol. I Tr., p.91, Ls.8-22.) Ms. Key responded that the only 
offense that she admitted to was simple possession, and that there was not any 
evidence that the car was used to facilitate this offense. (Vol. I Tr., p.93, Ls.1-12.) 
The district court sentenced Ms. Key to five years, with two years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.102, Ls.2-9; R., p.96-97.) The court 
took the matter of the criminal forfeiture of Ms. Key's car under advisement. (Vol. 1 
Tr., p.103, Ls.6-16.) Ms. Key was eventually placed on probation for five years. (Vol. 1 
Tr., p.108, L.14 - p.109, L.1; R., pp.116-120) Thereafter, the district court entered an 
order of civil forfeiture granting the State's request for forfeiture of Ms. Key's car. 
(R., pp.125-128.) Ms. Key timely appeals from the district court's order forfeiting her 
vehicle. 
ISSUES 
1. Was Ms. Key's constitutional right to a jury trial, pursuant to Article 1, 5 7 of the 
Idaho State Constitution, violated when the issue of whether the State was 
entitled to forfeiture of Ms. Key's vehicle was tried before the district court judge, 
despite the fact that Ms. Key never waived her right to a jury determination of this 
issue? 
2.' Was Ms. Key's constitutional right to a jury trial, pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States constitution, violated when the issue of whether 
the State was entitled to forfeiture of Ms. Key's vehicle was tried before the 
district court judge, despite the fact that Ms. Key never waived her right to a jury 
determination of this issue? 
3. Did the district court err when it failed to make a determination, pursuant to 
I.C.§37-2809, whether the size of the property forfeited was unfairly 
disproportionate to the size of the property actually used in the commission of 
Ms. Key's underlying offense? 
4. Did the district court's order forfeiting Ms. Key's vehicle violate the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against excessive fines? 
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it determined that Ms. Key's 
vehicle was used to commit or facilitate her offense of possession of marijuana? 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
Ms. Kev's Constitutional Right To A Jurv Trial, Pursuant To Article 1. S 7 Of The ldaho 
State Constitution. Was Violated When The lssue Of Whether The State Was Entitled 
To Forfeiture Of Ms. Kev's Vehicle Was Tried Before The District Court Judae, Despite 
The Fact That Ms. Kev Never Waived Her Riqht To A Jurv Determination Of This lssue 
A. Introduction 
The right to a jury trial in statutory forfeiture actions was recognized at common 
law at the time of the adoption of the ldaho Constitution in 1889. As such, the ldaho 
Constitution recognizes a right to jury trial for statutory forfeiture actions. Because 
Ms. Key never waived her right to a jury determination as to the forfeiture issue in this 
case, her right to a jury trial pursuant to Article 1, 3 7 of the ldaho State Constitution was 
violated when the issue of whether the State was entitled to criminal forfeiture of her 
vehicle was tried before the district court 
B. Standard Of Review 
This Court reviews claims of a violation of the ldaho State constitutional right to a 
jury trial de novo. See, e.g., State v. Sfover, 140 ldaho 927, 929, 104 P.3d 969, 971 
(2005). 
C. Ms. Key's Constitutional Riaht To A Jurv Trial. Pursuant To Article 1, 6 7 Of The 
ldaho State Constitution. Was Violated When The lssue Of Whether The State 
Was Entitled To Forfeiture Of Ms. Kev's Vehicle Was Tried Before The District 
Court Judqe, Despite The Fact That Ms. Key Never Waived Her Riqht To A Jury 
Determination Of This lssue 
As an initial matter, it does not appear from the record that Ms. Key objected to 
the district court hearing the evidence and making the determination regarding whether 
the State was entitled to forfeiture of her vehicle. However, Ms. Key asserts that this 
issue is justiciable by this Court as a fundamental error that may be raised for the first 
time on appeal. 
While normally this Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal, an exception is made if the error complained of rises to the level of a 
fundamental error. See e.g. State v. Contreras-Gonzales, 146 ldaho 41, 47, 190 P.3d 
197, 203 (Ct. App. 2008). An error is fundamental if it relates to important constitutional 
rights of the defendant, goes to the foundation of the case, or takes away from the 
defendant a right which is essential to his or her defense and which no court ought to 
permit the defendant to waive by mere silence. State v. Christiansen, 144 ldaho 463, 
470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007). This Court determines whether an error is 
fundamental on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
A complete violation of the right to a jury trial, particularly given the specific and 
stringent observation of this right under the ldaho State Constitution, is a fundamental 
error. Article I ,  3 7 of the ldaho State Constitution provides that the "right of trial by jury 
shall remain inviolate," and further provides that, while a jury trial may be waived in a 
criminal case, such waiver can only be made "by the consent of all parties, expressed in 
open court," and waived in a manner that is proscribed by law. As noted by the ldaho 
Supreme Court: 
Our forefathers wisely provided in Article 1, Section 7 of the ldaho 
Constitution: "The right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate ..." They so 
provided because they recognized that the jury system is the single most 
important guardian of the people's right to be protected from oppressive 
and overreaching government. 
David Steed & Assoc., Inc. v. Young, 115 ldaho 247, 248, 766 P.2d 717, 718 (1988) 
(overruled on ofher grounds by ldaho First Natg Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 
ldaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991)). 
The record reflects that Ms. Key was never apprised of her right to a jury 
determination on the issue of forfeiture of her vehicle, and she expressly reserved the 
right to challenge this forfeiture in her plea agreement. (R., p.81.) Given the strong 
protections of the right to a jury determination under the ldaho constitution, this error 
rises to the level of a fundamental error that is justiciable for the first time on appeal. 
No ldaho court has yet addressed the issue of whether there exists a right to a 
jury trial in criminal forfeiture actions. Resolution of the issue of whether there is a right 
to a jury trial of a particular action under the ldaho State Constitution depends upon 
whether that action was recognized under the common law at the time that the ldaho 
Constitution was adopted in 1889. ldaho Depf. of Law Enforcement v. Free, 126 ldaho 
422, 425, 885 P.2d 381, 384 (1994). This is because, "Article 1, § 7 of the ldaho 
Constitution preserves the right to jury trial as it existed at the common law and under 
the territorial statutes when the ldaho Constitution was adopted in 1889." Id. 
Ms. Key acknowledges that the statute defining criminal forfeiture actions 
indicates that there is no right to jury trial for such actions. See I.C. § 37-2801. 
However, the ldaho Supreme Court has previously addressed the right to a jury 
pursuant to the ldaho Constitution in statutory forfeiture actions, and determined that 
there is a constitutional right to jury trial in civil forfeiture actions. Free, 126 ldaho at 
427, 885 P.2d at 386. And the Free Court reached this holding despite a statutory 
provision indicating that there was no right to jury trial in civil forfeiture actions. Id.; 
I.C. § 37-2744A(d). 
The Free Court began by analyzing whether there was a constitutional right to 
jury trial in statutory forfeiture actions at common law. After surveying the common law 
analyses of this issue from other courts, the Free Court then determined that, "as of 
1845 there was a right to jury trial in in rem forfeiture proceedings heard in common law 
courts." Id. at 426, 885 P.2d at 385 (quoting in re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 
So.2d 433,436 (Fla. 1986)). Because all statutory forfeiture proceedings were afforded 
the right to a jury trial at common law, the Free Court held: 
It is uncontroverted that forfeitures existed, and were afforded a jury trial, 
under English and American practice. In addition, Idaho's statutes 
adopted the common law of England unless otherwise provided and 
neither the Department nor independent research reveals any provision 
limiting the right to jury trial in civil forfeiture actions. We find it unlikely, 
given the general rule regarding forfeitures under the English and 
American law, that ldaho held otherwise at the time it adopted its 
Constitution. We hold, therefore, that there is a right to jury trial for 
forfeiture proceedings under I.C. § 37-2744A because that right existed at 
common law when the ldaho Constitution was adopted and that, to the 
extent that I.C. 3 37-2744A denies such a right, it is unconstitutional. 
Id. at 427. 995 P.2d at 386. 
This same conclusion has been reached by numerous other courts confronted 
with the issue of whether there is a state constitutional right to a jury trial for statutory 
forfeiture actions. See, e.g., See State v. Twelve Thousand Dollars, 455 P.3d 858, 864 
(Ok. Ct. App. 2007); State v. One 1969 Blue Ponfiac Firebird, 737 N.W.2d 271, 274-275 
(S.D. 2007); see also U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998) (finding that criminal 
forfeitures were part of the punishment imposed for felonies in the Middle Ages and at 
common law). In fact, more than one of these courts has noted that the right to a jury 
trial at common law for statutory forfeiture actions was so well-documented that its 
recognition is "inescapable." See Sfafe v. Twelve Thousand Dollars, 155 P.3d at 864; 
State v. One 1969 Blue Ponfiac Firebird, 737 N.W.2d at 275. 
Because there was a right to jury trial in statutory forfeiture actions at common 
law at the time of the adoption of the ldaho Constitution, and in light of the fact that the 
ldaho Supreme Court has already determined that there is a constitutional right to a jury 
in the civil adjunct to criminal forfeiture actions, Ms. Key had a right to a jury 
determination of whether the State was entitled to the forfeiture of her vehicle based 
upon her conviction of possession of marijuana. To the extent that I.C. § 37-2801 
conflicts with this right by asserting that the issue of criminal forfeiture is to be tried 
solely before the district court, and not before a jury, this Court should give this 
unconstitutional portion of the statute no force or effect. Free, 126 ldaho at 427, 885 
P.2d at 386. 
In this case, it appears that Ms. Key was never informed of her right to a jury trial 
on the State's forfeiture motion, much less that she knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived this right. A waiver of the right to a jury trial will be upheld only if the 
entire record shows that such waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 
State v. Murphy, 125 ldaho 456, 456-457, 872 P.2d 719, 719-720 (1994). The record in 
this case cannot support any such finding. Because Ms. Key never waived her right to 
a jury determination as to whether the State was entitled to forfeiture of her vehicle, Ms. 
Key's right to a jury trial pursuant to Article I ,  3 7 of the ldaho State Constitution was 
violated in this case. 
Ms. Kev's Constitutional Riqht To A Juw Trial. Pursuant To The Sixth Amendment Of 
The United States Constitution. Was Violated When The Issue Of Whether The State 
Was Entitled To Forfeiture Of Ms. Kev's Vehicle Was Tried Before The District Court, 
Despite The Fact That Ms. Key Never Waived Her Rinht To A Juw Determination Of 
This Issue 
A. Introduction 
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies to any fact which increases the 
punishment that a defendant may face based upon the commission of an offense. In 
this case, there were two factual showings that were required before the additional 
penalty of forfeiture could be imposed on Ms. Key based upon her commission of the 
underlying offense of possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces: first, that 
Ms. Key's vehicle was used in the commission, or facilitated the commission, of her 
underlying offense of possession of marijuana; and second, that forfeiture of the vehicle 
was proportionate to her offense. These facts were not admitted by Ms. Key as part of 
her underlying plea agreement, nor did she expressly waive her right to a jury 
determination of these facts. As such, the determination of these facts by the district 
court in imposing the additional criminal punishment of forfeiture violated Ms. Key's 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 
6. Standard Of Review 
Constitutional issues are questions of law that this Court reviews de novo. See, 
e.g., State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 513, 164 P.3d 790, 793 (2007). 
C. Ms. Kev's Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial. Pursuant To The Sixth 
Amendment Of The United States Constitution, Was Violated When The lssue Of 
Whether The State Was Entitled To Forfeiture Of Ms. Kev's Vehicle Was Tried 
Before The District Court, Despite The Fact That Ms. Key Never Waived Her 
Right To A Jury Determination Of This lssue 
As previously noted, certain errors, known as fundamental errors, are reviewable 
on appeal regardless of whether these errors were actually raised before the district 
court. See, e.g., Sfate v. Bingham, 116 ldaho 415, 423, 776 P.2d 424, 432 (1989). 
"Error that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the foundation or basis of a 
defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from the defendant a 
right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him 
to waive. Each case will of necessity, under such a rule, stand on its own merits." Id. 
(quoting State v. Garcia, 128 P.2d 459, 462 (N.M. 1942). 
A direct violation of an important constitutional right may constitute a fundamental 
error that is reviewable by this Court for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. 
Kenner, 121 ldaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992) (finding that allegation that 
district court violated constitutional right against self-incrimination is allegation of a 
fundamental error); State v. Yakovic, 145 ldaho 437, 442, 180 P.3d 476, 481 (2008) 
(fundamental error not shown when alleged error did not violate a fundamental right); 
Sfafe v. Christiansen, 144 ldaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007) (alleged 
violation based on defendant's exercise of Fourth Amendment rights is fundamental 
error); State v. Timmons, 145 ldaho 279, 291, 178 P.3d 644, 656 (Ct. App. 2007); 
Minfun v. State, 144 ldaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App. 2007) (presuming for 
purposes of appeal that violation of Confrontation Clause is allegation of fundamental 
error). 
The centrality of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a right to a jury trial cannot 
be overstated. In fact, this right is so important that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
declared that its denial constitutes a structural error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275, 281-282 (1993). As noted by the Sullivan Court, the right to a jury trial is a basic 
protection, without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function, and which 
reflects "a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and 
justice administered." Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968)). 
Based upon the importance of this constitutional right, the deprivation of Ms. Key's right 
to a jury trial, as provided under the Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution, rises 
to the level of a fundamental error. 
Under the Sixth Amendment, any fact, other than a prior criminal conviction, 
which increases the maximum range of punishment that a defendant may receive for a 
criminal offense must be submitted to the jury and proved by the State beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004); Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,697-703 (1975). In 
light of these constitutional holdings, ldaho cases have recognized that any fact that a 
jury would have to find in order to increase the range of punishment faced by the 
defendant must be treated as an element of the offense for purposes of pleading and 
proof. See, e.g., State v. Gerardo, 147 ldaho 22, 30, 205 P.3d 671, 679 (Ct. App. 
2009). 
While the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed, and rejected, the assertion that 
there is a Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination in criminal forfeiture actions, 
the Court's basis for doing so has since been disavowed by the Supreme Court. 
Libretti v. U.S., 516 U.S. 29, 48-49 (1995). The Libretti Court rendered its decision 
several years before the holdings in Blakely and Apprendi, and the Libretti Opinion is 
based upon the exact rationale disavowed by these subsequent opinions. 
The basis for the holding in Libretti that there was not a Sixth Amendment right to 
jury trial in criminal forfeiture actions was the Court's distinction between elements of an 
offense that demonstrate the defendant's guilt and facts that form the basis of 
sentencing determinations. Libretti, 516 U.S. at 48-49. The Libretti Court held that, 
"Our cases have made abundantly clear that a defendant does not enjoy a constitutional 
right to a jury determination as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed." Id. at 49. 
The Court relied for this proposition on case law stating that, "there is no Sixth 
Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns upon specific 
findings of fact." Id. (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S 79, 93 (1986)). 
The basis for Libretti's rationale - that there is absolutely no right to jury findings 
of fact with regard to sentencing issues - has been clearly disavowed. In fact, the 
Apprendi Court expressly limited McMillan, the case primarily relied upon in Libretti, to 
only those cases that do not involve imposition of a sentence more severe than is 
available based solely on the jury's verdict. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486-487 n.13. In its 
place stand the holdings of Blakely and Apprendi, which are the legal standards that 
should be applied by this Court in determining whether Ms. Key had a Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial as to the State's forfeiture request. Under the Blakely and Apprendi 
standards, Ms. Key's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated in this case. 
There were key factual findings that were required before the district court was 
permitted by law to impose the additional criminal penalty of forfeiture against Ms. Key: 
first, that Ms. Key's vehicle was used in the commission, or facilitated the commission, 
of her underlying offense of possession of marijuana; and second, that forfeiture of the 
vehicle was proportionate to her offense - i.e. that the size of the property forfeited was 
not unfairly disproportionate to the size of the property actually used in the commission 
of her offense. I.C. 33 37-2801, 37-2809. Ms. Key never admitted to these facts in her 
plea agreement. In fact, her agreement carried with it the express condition that she 
resewed the right to challenge the State's forfeiture claim against her car. (R., p.81.) 
Ms. Key also never expressly waived her right to a jury determination as to these facts. 
Because these were factual findings that increased the maximum punishment that the 
district court could impose for Ms. Key's offense, Ms. Key's right to a jury trial was 
violated when the forfeiture issue was tried before the district court rather than to a jury. 
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Make A Determination, Pursuant To 
I.C. 6 37-2809, Whether The Size Of The Propertv Forfeited Was Unfairly 
Disproportionate To The Size Of The Propertv Actuallv Used In The Commission Of 
Ms. Kev's Underlvina Offense 
A. Introduction 
Under Idaho's statutory scheme establishing criminal forfeiture actions, forfeiture 
is available as a criminal sanction only if the size of the property forfeited is not "unfairly 
disproportionate to the size of the property actually used in violation of the provisions of 
this chapter." I.C. 3 37-2809. The district court in this case failed to follow this 
mandatory legal standard when the court entered a forfeiture order without making any 
determination as to whether this property was proportionate to her offense under the 
standards of proportionality outlined in I.C. § 37-2809. 
B. Standard of Review 
In reviewing a district court's determination in'a criminal forfeiture action brought 
pursuant to I.C. 3 37-2801, this court defers to the district court's findings of fact where 
they are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but reviews issues of 
statutory construction de novo. State v. Stevens, 139 ldaho 670, 674-675, 84 P.3d 
1038, 1042-1043 (Ct. App. 2004). Statutes authorizing the forfeiture of property are 
strictly construed against the State. See State v. Twelve Thousand Dollars, 155 P.3d at 
861. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Make A Determination, Pursuant To 
I.C. 5 37-2809, Whether The Size Of The Property Forfeited Was Unfairly 
Disproportionate To The Size Of The Property Actually Used In The Commission 
Of Ms. Key's Underlying Offense 
By statute, the size of the property that the State may be permitted to take in a 
forfeiture action is limited to the extent to which that property constituted an 
instrumentality of the offense. ldaho Code 3 37-2809 provides that the "size of the 
property forfeited shall not be unfairly disproportionate to the size of the property 
actually used in violation of the provisions of this chapter." I.C. ?j 37-2809. This 
provision is a codification of what is sometimes referred to as the "instrumentalities test" 
for the excessiveness of a forfeiture. 
The instrumentalities test has been described in Justice Scalia's dissent in 
Austin v. U.S., 509 U.S. 602, 627-629 (1993) (J. Scalia, dissenting). The proportionality 
of forfeitures under this test is fixed, "not by determining the appropriate value of the 
penalty in relation to the committed offense, but by determining what property has been 
'tainted' by unlawful use." Id. at 627. In further explaining how such determinations are 
made, Justice Scalia writes: 
... an in rem forfeiture goes beyond the traditional limits that the Eighth 
Amendment permits if it applies to property that cannot be properly 
regarded as an instrument of the offense - the building, for example, in 
which an isolated drug sale happens to occur. Such a confiscation would 
be an excessive fine. The question is not how much the confiscated 
property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a close 
enough relationship to the offense. 
Id. at 627-628. 
As such, under this test, the central question is the degree to which the property 
has been put to use in unlawful activity. It is also important to note that Idaho's statutory 
instrumentality test for proportionality must be met in addition to, rather than in lieu of, 
the constitutional test for gross disproportionality. See, e.g., Miller v. One 2001 Pontiac 
Aztek, 669 N.W.2d 893, 896-897 n.2, (Minn. 2003). Because the Idaho legislature has 
chosen to adopt a particular showing of proportionality, in addition to those standards 
that are mandated under the federal constitution, both standards should be given effect 
by this Court. 
Here, there has been no determination of how much of Ms. Key's car was 
"actually used" in her underlying offense of possession of marijuana. Moreover, the 
State was seeking permanent deprivation of Ms. Key's car for what was, at best, a 
tangential and fleeting relationship between Ms. Key's vehicle and her underlying 
offense of a single instance of possessing marijuana. This is analogous to the example 
brought forth by Justice Scalia of the unreasonableness of seeking forfeiture of an entire 
building based upon a single use of that building to sell drugs. Given the very limited 
scope of relation or nexus between Ms. Key's car and her underlying offense of 
possession of marijuana, the permanent forfeiture of her car was an unfairly 
disproportionate forfeiture in relation to the size of the property actually used in her 
underlying offense. 
The District Court's Order Forfeiting Ms. Kev's Vehicle Violated The Eighth Amendment 
Prohibition Against Excessive Fines 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Key asserts that the forfeiture of her vehicle was a grossly disproportionate 
punishment in relation her underlying offense of possession of marijuana. Therefore, 
the district court's order granting the State's motion seeking forfeiture violated her 
Eighth Amendment rights protecting against excessive fines. 
8. Standard Of Review 
This Court reviews the issue of whether a forfeiture order was unconstitutionally 
excessive under the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines de novo. 
Bajakajian, 534 U.S. at 336-337; Nez Perce County Prosecuting Atty. v. Reese, 142 
Idaho 893, 897, 136 P.3d 364, 368 (Ct. App. 2006); Von Hoff v. US.,  492 F.3d 175, 181 
(2nd Cir. 2007). 
C. District Court's Order Grantinq The State's Motion Seeking Forfeiture Of 
Ms. Key's Vehicle Violated The Eiahth Amendment Prohibition Aqainst Excessive 
Fines 
The Eighth Amendment provides that, "[elxcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. 
AMEND. VIII. The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment restricts the 
government's power to extract payments, including payments in kind. Reese, 142 
ldaho at 898, 136 P.3d at 369. Forfeitures are payments in kind and, thus, are fines 
that are subject to Eighth Amendment review if they constitute punishments for an 
offense. Id. 
There can be no meaningful dispute that a criminal forfeiture order entered 
pursuant to I.C. § 37-2801 is a punishment. The title for the chapter of the code section 
that authorizes such forfeitures is titled, "Criminal Forfeitures," indicating that this mode 
of forfeiture is intended as part of punishments available for a criminal offense. Such 
forfeitures are only available against a defendant who has pleaded guilty or been found 
guilty of a drug offense pursuant to the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, and the 
forfeiture order is to be made "in addition to any other sentence imposed" for such 
offense. I.C. § 37-2801. In addition, the ldaho legislature has made provisions for an 
"innocent owner defense" for third parties with an interest in the property, which is an 
important indication that the criminal forfeiture statute is intended as punishment. See 
Reese, 142 ldaho at 898, 136 P.3d at 369; State v. Twelve Thousand Dollars, 155 P.3d 
858, 863 (Ok. Ct. App. 2007); I.C. § 37-2807. As such, a criminal forfeiture order 
constitutes punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
excessive fines. 
Moreover, the ldaho Supreme Court and ldaho Court of Appeals have both 
already determined that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines 
applies in the context of civil forfeiture actions, in which there is not even a direct 
requirement of any underlying conviction of a criminal offense in support of the 
forfeiture. Free, 126 ldaho at 423-425, 885 P.2d at 382-384; Reese, 142 ldaho at 898- 
899, 136 P.3d at 369-370. This is in accord with the holdings of the United States 
Supreme Court, which has held that a forfeiture that is imposed at the culmination of 
criminal proceedings as a result of a conviction constitutes punishment for purposes of 
invoking the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 
327-328. 
The standard for determining whether the amount of forfeiture ordered by the 
district court was excessive, and therefore constitutes a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment, is whether the forfeiture order is "grossly disproportionate" to the gravity of 
the underlying offense. Bajakajian, 534 U.S. at 336-337. This is the same standard of 
gross disproportionality that is otherwise employed in case law dealing with cruel and 
unusual punishments. Id. "The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the 
Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality - the amount of the forfeiture 
must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense it is designed to punish.'' Id. at 
334; Reese, 142 ldaho at 899,136 P.3d at 370. 
The inquiry as to proportionality is a factually intensive determination that 
requires the court to consider a variety of factors. Among these are: the gravity of the 
offense; the overall culpability of the offender; the harm caused in the commission of the 
offense; the value of the property - including its intangible value to the owner; the 
hardship that deprivation of that property would work to the defendant; the overall effect 
of the forfeiture on the defendant's family or financial circumstances; and the 
relationship between the offense and the property, including the importance and extent 
of the use of the property in the underlying offense. Bajakajian, 534 U.S. at 339; Reese, 
142 Idaho at 899-900, 136 P.3d at 370-371; Von Hofe, 492 F.3d at 182. "Remand is 
required where the trial court relies on one factor without evaluating the import of other 
relevant factors for determining whether forfeiture is excessive." Reese, 142 Idaho at 
899, 136 P.3d at 370. 
In this case, the district court never made any determination as to whether the 
forfeiture of Ms. Key's vehicle was proportionate to her offense. (R., pp.125-128.) In 
failing to do so, the district court did not act consistently with applicable legal standards, 
both statutory and constitutional, that require that any forfeiture order be proportionate 
to the defendant's underlying offense. Because the district court failed to weigh the 
proportionality of the forfeiture order to the nature of her underlying offense, this Court 
should vacate the district court's order granting the State's motion to forfeit Ms. Key's 
vehicle, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Determined That Ms. Kev's Vehicle 
Was Used To Commit Or Facilitate Her Offense Of Possession Of Mariiuana 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Key asserts that the State failed to meet its burden to establish that her 
vehicle was used to facilitate the commission of her underlying offense of possession of 
marijuana in an amount greater than three ounces. As such, the district court erred 
when it granted the State's motion for forfeiture of Ms. Key's vehicle. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing a district court's determination in a criminal forfeiture action brought 
pursuant to I.C. 9 37-2801, this court defers to the district court's findings of fact where 
they are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but reviews issues of 
statutory construction de novo. Stevens, 139 ldaho at 674-675, 84 P.3d at 1042-1043. 
Statutes authorizing the forfeiture of property are strictly construed against the State. 
See State v. Twelve Thousand Dollars. 155 P.3d at 861. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Determined That Ms. Kev's Vehicle Was Used 
To Commit Or Facilitate Her Offense Of Possession Of Marijuana 
ldaho Code § 37-2801 provides in pertinent part that: 
Any person who is found guilty of, who enters a plea of guilty, or who is 
convicted of a violation of the uniform controlled substances act, chapter 
27, title 37, ldaho Code, punishable by imprisonment for more than one 
(I) year, no matter the form of the judgment or order withholding 
judgment, shall forfeit to the state of ldaho: 
(2) Any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in 
any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of 
such violation. 
I.C. § 37-2801 
The criminal forfeiture statute is significantly more limited in scope than the civil 
forfeiture statute - unlike a civil forfeiture brought pursuant to I.C. 3 37-2744, criminal 
forfeiture is limited solely to property that facilitated the specific crime for which the 
defendant has been convicted. Stevens, 139 ldaho at 675, 84 P.3d at 1043. Therefore, 
in order for the State to succeed in a criminal forfeiture action, the State must prove a 
relationship between the property at issue and the defendant's specific crime. Id. 
With regards to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, the 
Stevens court held, in dicta, that, had the evidence demonstrated that the defendant's 
vehicle was used to acquire the drugs that were in the defendant's possession, the 
requisite relationship between the vehicle and the drugs would be established for 
purposes of permitting forfeiture that vehicle. Id. 
In this case, the district court relied on Stevens in support of its forfeiture order. 
(R., pp.127-128.) However, the Stevens Court has indicated that, to establish the 
required nexus under I.C. 3 37-2801, the vehicle must be somehow used in order to 
purchase or otherwise acquire, and therefore come into possession of, the drugs that 
are the subject of the defendant's crime. Stevens, 139 Idaho at 675, 84 P.3d at 1043. 
The Stevens court also rejected the "slight nexus" test derived from federal civil 
forfeiture actions, which required a much lesser showing of relation to the underlying 
offense than does Idaho's criminal forfeiture statute. Id. Because the State - in Sfevens 
opted to seek criminal forfeiture, it "thereby assumed a more difficult burden to prove a 
relationship between Steven's motorcycle and the specific offense of which he was 
convicted." Id. 
With regard to forfeitures of cars in particular, a direct and substantial connection 
to the underlying criminal offense is required given the pervasive and ubiquitous 
presence of cars in everyday life. See, e.g., Riley v. 1987 Station Wagon, 650 N.W.2d 
441,445 (Minn. 2002). As noted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Riley: 
With respect to vehicular conveyances in particular, "common sense 
dictates that the law require a substantially significant connection with 
criminal activity before an ordinary automobile may be seized and forfeited 
to the Government." The reason is that the use of the automobile in our 
society is pervasive. A car by itself is not contraband and there is little 
activity that the use of a car does not "facilitate" to some degree. 
Id. 
Here, the requisite relationship between Ms. Key's car and her underlying 
offense was not established by the State. There was no proof that Ms. Key used her 
car in order to acquire the drugs, thereby facilitating her possession. The State's sole 
argument advanced in support of its forfeiture request was that the car was used as a 
means of transporting the drugs, thereby facilitating its possession. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.91, 
Ls.8-22.) Without more, this is merely an allegation of fleeting and incidental 
relationship between Ms. Key's possession of the drugs and the vehicle itself. Given 
the heightened burden on the State in criminal forfeiture actions, this was insufficient to 
establish the required relationship of a direct and substantial connection between 
Ms. Key's car and her offense of possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces. 
As such, Ms. Key asks that this Court reverse, with prejudice, the district court's order 
granting the State's motion seeking forfeiture of her vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Key respectfully requests that this Court reverse with prejudice the district 
court's order granting the State's motion seeking forfeiture of her vehicle. In the 
alternative, she respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
granting the State's motion seeking forfeiture of her vehicle, and remand this case for 
further proceedings. 
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